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Evidence
Marc T. Treadwell
I.

INTRODUCTION

Daubert' inspired appeals again occupied much of the Eleventh
Circuit's time during the survey period. As discussed in detail below,
the Eleventh Circuit held in Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc.2 that
Daubert applies only to witnesses claiming scientific expertise, a decision
which sent parties scrambling as they sought to avoid or to invoke
Daubert. However, after the survey period, the Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Carmichael. In Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael,' the Supreme Court held that Daubert applies to all expert
testimony and is not limited to "scientific" testimony. The Court also
held that all four Daubert factors (testing, peer review, error rates, and
scientific acceptability) need not be satisfied for expert testimony to be
admissible. Rather, district courts, in performing their gatekeeping
analysis of the reliability of expert testimony, are entitled to great
flexibility and their inquiry will be determined by the particular facts of
the case.
II.

PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS

In a case of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit considered in Horton
v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., whether the common law
presumption against suicide should apply in an action brought under the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").5 In Horton

Partner in the firm of Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Macon, Georgia. Valdosta State
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1981). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997).
3. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
4. 141 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1998).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1998).
*
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plaintiff's husband, who died in a private plane crash, brought suit
against two insurance carriers that issued life insurance policies to the
husband's employer as a part of the employer's benefit plans. The
insurance companies claimed that the husband committed suicide.' The
court first noted that although ERISA does not provide for presumptions,
courts are free "to develop a body of federal common law to govern issues
in ERISA actions not covered by the Act itself."7 A court may fashion
such common law rules if the rule furthers ERISA's scheme of protecting
"the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employment benefit
plans" and ERISA's goal of "uniformity in the administration of
employee benefits plans ....

."

The court concluded that the common

law presumption against suicide met this standard.' Although the court
recognized that the presumption favored beneficiaries over the interests
of employee benefit plans and insurance companies, the court concluded,
after reviewing the history of the common law presumption against
suicide, that the presumption was "grounded in tested observations of
human behavior and in American legal history."" In addition, the
court reasoned Congress was presumably aware of this well-established
common law rule, and, under such circumstances, the court felt free to
apply the rule unless "'a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.""' Finding no conflict with ERISA's statutory purpose, the court
held that the district court properly applied the common law presumption against suicide.'"
III. RELEVANCY
Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is the principal rule of
evidence addressing the admissibility of "extrinsic act evidence" or
evidence of acts and transactions other than the one at issue. Rule 404
primarily bars the introduction of evidence of prior misconduct offered
to prove that a party is more likely to have committed the charged
offense or engaged in the conduct at issue because of that prior
misconduct." Although extrinsic act evidence is not admissible to
prove a party's propensity to engage in misconduct, it is admissible "for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

141 F.3d at 1040.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)).
Id. at 1042.

13.

FED. R. EVID. 404.
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plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."14 The
Eleventh Circuit applies a three-part test, often called the Beechum test,
to determine the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence.15 First, the
extrinsic act evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the
defendant's character. Second, the prosecution must prove the defendant
committed the extrinsic act. Third, the evidence must survive a Rule
40316 balancing test, that is, the probative value of the extrinsic act
evidence must not be outweighed by its prejudicial effect.'" In recent
years, the author has speculated that the Eleventh Circuit has
dramatically lowered its level of scrutiny of evidentiary issues. The
Eleventh Circuit's treatment of extrinsic act evidence offers support for
this speculation. In its more activist days, or at least when it was more
active with regard to evidentiary issues, the Eleventh Circuit frequently
engaged in micro-Rule 404(b) analysis and often concluded that the
district courts abused their discretion in admitting extrinsic act
evidence. In more recent years, however, Rule 404 has been much less
a factor in Eleventh Circuit decisions. This trend continued during the
current survey period.
In United States v. Mills, 8 defendants, a husband and wife who
owned a Medicare services provider, were convicted of making false
statements, mail fraud, Medicare fraud, and witness tampering. On
appeal, the wife claimed that the district court improperly admitted
evidence that she concealed items from customs inspectors years before
the charged offense. The district court concluded that the evidence was
admissible under Rule 404(b) because it showed the wife's "'propensity'
to conceal facts and was thus relevant to [her] intent." 9 On appeal,
picking up on this ruling, the Government argued that the customs
incident was admissible because it demonstrated the wife's willingness
to deceive government agents for personal financial gain. The Eleventh
Circuit made short work of the district court's conclusion and the
Government's argument.20
Restated, the Government's asserted relevant inference is that we can
gather from the customs incident that Margie is disposed to lie to the
government; therefore, being a liar, she must have intended to lie [with

14. Id.
15. United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Beechum,
582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
16. FED. R. EvID. 403.
17. 138 F.3d at 935.
18. Id. at 928.
19. Id. at 935.
20. Id. at 936.

1022

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

regard to the acts leading to the charged offenses]. This inference is
precisely the one that Rule 404(b) prohibits: it makes an element of
the crime (intent to lie) more probable because of the defendant's
character (liar).2
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the extrinsic act evidence.2 2 This, however,
did not require reversal. 23 Because there was overwhelming evidence
that the wife intentionally engaged in the conduct giving rise to the
charged offenses, the court held the error was harmless.24
Judge Hatchett, in dissent, disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the error was harmless. 25 Reviewing the evidence, he concluded
there was scant evidence of the wife's specific intent to commit the
charged offenses.26
Without the improper character evidence, the government's proof of
intent to falsify was essentially limited to [the wife's] business conduct.
The customs inspector's testimony, however, vastly expanded the scope
of [the wife's] untruthfulness to a context more familiar to the jury
than First American. In my view, jurors were much more likely to
understand lying to a customs inspector than failing to document travel
on a company airplane. At the very least, the customs inspector's
testimony uncomfortably invited a jury to connect with, interpret and
act upon the notion that [the wife] was liar in general. 7
Thus, because the Government's evidence of intent was weak, the
extrinsic act evidence was likely prejudicial.28
Judge Hatchett's point, insofar as it relates to improperly admitted
extrinsic act evidence, is well taken. However, the fact that the
Government's case is weak actually makes it more likely that extrinsic
act evidence will be admissible. In United States v. Calderon," the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the connection between the extrinsic
act and the charged offense was remote. However, the court was
unwilling to hold that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the testimony.3 0 With regard to the third prong of the
Beechum test, whether the probative value of the evidence is substantial-

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 942.
Id. at 944.
Id.

28. Id.
29. 127 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997).
30. Id. at 1333.
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ly outweighed by unfair prejudice, the court noted it was appropriate to
consider the Government's need for the evidence."' "As we have
explained, 'if the government can do without such evidence, fairness
dictates that it should; but if the evidence is essential to obtain a
conviction, it may come in. This may seem like a "heads I win; tails you
lose" proposition, but it is presently the law.'" 32 Thus, the weaker the
Government's case, the33 stronger its argument that shaky extrinsic act
evidence is admissible.
In United States v. McLean,s4 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that
evidence "inextricably intertwined" with the charged offense is not
extrinsic act evidence for purposes of Rule 404(b). In McLean the court
agreed with the Government's contention that the evidence at issue was
vital to an understanding of the context of the Government's case and
thus, was evidence of the charged offense rather than extrinsic act
evidence.3 ' This holding was critical because the Government had
failed to provide notice of its intent to introduce extrinsic act evidence
as required by Rule 404(b), and thus, if the evidence was extrinsic, it
could not be admitted.
When character evidence is admissible, Rule 405 provides the methods
for proving character.3 6 In Schafer v. Time, Inc.,37 plaintiff contended
that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his prior acts of
misconduct in the trial of his libel claim against Time. The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed. 8 Under Georgia law, a party who claims his
reputation has been injured by libelous statements necessarily places his
character in issue." Rule 405(b) provides that "[i]n cases in which
character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a
charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances
of [that person's] conduct."4 ° Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the

31. Id. at 1332.
32. Id. (quoting United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044, 1049 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 985 (1991)).
33. In United States v. Hubert, 138 F.3d 912,914 (11th Cir. 1998), the Eleventh Circuit
also held that the district court erred when it admitted extrinsic act evidence, but it also
held that this error was harmless.
34. 138 F.3d 1398 (11th Cir. 1998).
35. Id. at 1405.
36. FED. R. EviD. 405.
37. 142 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1998).
38. Id. at 1373.
39. Id. at 1370.
40. FED. R. EvID. 405(b).
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district court did not err in admitting evidence of plaintiff's prior
misconduct.41
IV.

WITNESSES

Rule 609(a)(1) provides that "evidence that a witness other than an
accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule
403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year ....
In United States v. Burston,4 3 the district court
allowed defendant to establish that a witness testifying against him had
been convicted of a felony but barred defendant from establishing the
number and nature of the felony convictions. Noting Rule 609(a)
provides that evidence of felony convictions "shall be admitted," the
Eleventh Circuit framed the issue as whether admitting evidence that
the witness had a felony conviction, but excluding evidence of the nature
and number of those convictions, satisfied the requirements of Rule
609.4 Rule 609, the court reasoned, presumes that felony convictions
have some probative value.45 Given this, it necessarily follows that the
extent of this probative value depends upon the nature and number of
felony convictions.4 6 For example, a murder conviction would have a
different impact on a juror's assessment of a witness's credibility than
a relatively minor drug conviction. 4' Further, the court noted that
other circuits had concluded that Rule 609(a) requires admission of the
number and nature of prior convictions. 48 Accordingly, the court held
that the district court erred in limiting defendant's examination of the
witness.49 Unfortunately for defendant, however, the court also held
the error was harmless. 50
Rule 609(b) limits the use of felony convictions that are more than ten
years old.5 These convictions are admissible if, among other things,
the court concludes that the probative value of the conviction outweighs
its prejudicial effect. In United States v. Pope,52 the court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

142 F.3d at 1373.
United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 1998).
159 F.3d 1328.
Id. at 1334-35.
Id. at 1335.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1336.
Id.

51. FED. R. EviD. 609(b).
52.

132 F.3d 684 (11th Cir. 1998).
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defendant to impeach a witness with evidence of the witness's twentyeight year-old conviction, noting that "convictions older than ten years
should be admitted for impeachment purposes only very rarely.""3
Rule 615, which contains the Federal Rules of Evidence's rule of
sequestration, has been amended, effective December 1, 1998, to provide
that "a person authorized by statute to be present" is not subject to
exclusion from the courtroom."
V.

OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.55 continued to hang like a pall over the Eleventh Circuit
during the survey period. The Court in Daubert,of course, held that the
Federal Rules of Evidence preempted decades of court decisions
governing the admission of expert testimony when it stated the Rules
supplanted the longstanding test for the admissibility of scientific
testimony established in Frye v. United States.5" In Frye57 the court
held that the admissibility of expert testimony is determined by whether
the subject matter of the testimony has been generally accepted as
reliable in the relevant scientific community.5 8 The Frye "general
acceptance" test, the Supreme Court held, was "incompatible with the
Federal Rules of Evidence."59 However, because the Court in Daubert
did not enunciate a "definitive checklist or test" but rather structured a
loose framework which the Court reckoned would be completed by lower
courts, it quickly became apparent that the true effect of the decision
would not be known until those lower court decisions made their way up
the appellate ladder. Since Daubert many of those decisions have been
up and down this appellate ladder.6° The current survey period was no
exception.
In Carmichael v. Samyang ire, Inc.,61 the Eleventh Circuit rejected
an attempt to apply Daubert to all expert testimony. Daubert, the court

53. Id. at 687 (citing United States v. Tisdale, 817 F.2d 1552, 1555 (11th Cir. 1987)).
54.

FED. R. EVID. 615.

55. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
56. Id. at 585-97.
57. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
58. Id. at 1014.
59. 509 U.S. at 589.
60. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), rev'd Joiner v. General
Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1996). As noted in last year's survey, the Supreme Court
reversed the Eleventh Circuit's most detailed analysis of Daubert to date, holding that the
Eleventh Circuit's rigid analysis was not compatible with the abuse of discretion standard
that governs appellate review of district court evidentiary decisions.
61. 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997).
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held, applies only to witnesses claiming scientific expertise.6 2 In
Carmichael plaintiffs attempted to rely on the testimony of an expert on
tire failure to establish that defendant's tire rim caused plaintiffs'
vehicle to crash. The district court excluded the expert testimony,
reasoning that the testimony did not satisfy Daubert's standard for
reliability of scientific evidence. 3
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit first noted that a scientific expert is
an expert who relies on the application of scientific principles." A
nonscientific expert relies on skill-based or experience-based observations to form his opinions.65 The court then used a rather unusual
example to illustrate the difference:
The distinction between scientific and non-scientific expert testimony
is a critical one. By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain to a
jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an aeronautical engineer might be
a helpful witness. Since flight principles have some universality, the
expert could apply general principles to the case of the bumblebee.
Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be
qualified to testify, as long as he was familiar with its component
parts.
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take
off into the wind, a beekeeper with no scientific training at all would
be an acceptable witness if a proper foundation were laid for his
conclusions. The foundation would not relate to his formal training,
but to his firsthand observations. In other words, the beekeeper does
not know anymore about flight principles than the jurors, but he has
seen a lot more bumblebees than they have."
The Eleventh Circuit, "[h]aving clarified the question posed by this
case," easily concluded that plaintiffs' expert testimony was not based on
scientific principles.67 Rather, the expert based his opinion on his
experience in analyzing failed tires." Based on this experience, which
consisted of years of examining tire failures, the expert said he could
identify physical evidence that revealed whether a tire failed because of
abuse or because of a defect.69 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the district court erred when it applied Daubert criteria to

62. Id. at
63. Id. at
64. Id. at
65. Id.
66. Id. at
1994)).
67. Id. at

68. Id.
69. Id.

1435.
1434.
1435.
1435-36 (quoting Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir.
1436.
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determine the admissibility of the expert's testimony.70 It noted,
however, that the testimony could still be excluded under Rule 702 if the
court found the testimony was not sufficiently reliable or if it was not of
assistance to the jury.7
Litigants who had seen their experts' testimony excluded by district
courts were quick to take advantage, or at least to attempt to take
advantage, of Carmichael. In Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Corp.
v. Benfield,72 the district court struck the testimony of defendants' fire
origin expert. Before Carmichael had been decided, defendants argued,
in their briefs to the Eleventh Circuit, that their expert's analysis and
testimony was of a scientific nature and was sufficiently reliable to
satisfy Daubert.8 When Carmichael was decided, however, defendants
quickly switched tactics: they argued that their expert's testimony was
not based on scientific principles but rather was based on his years of
experience and on his skill and experience-based observations. After
reviewing the expert's testimony, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that he
had in fact based his opinions on scientific principles, and therefore, the
district court properly applied Daubert to the expert's testimony.74
In United States v. Gilliard,5 the Eleventh Circuit faced a more
traditional Daubertquestion; whether a polygraph examiner's methodology satisfied the Daubert test. The district court held that it did not.76
The Eleventh Circuit first recognized its decision in United States v.
Piccinonna77 which reversed the Eleventh Circuit's longstanding
absolute ban on the admission of polygraph evidence. Under Piccinonna
polygraph evidence may be admissible if the parties stipulate to its
admissibility or to impeach or corroborate the testimony of a witness at
trial.78 In Gilliard because the Government would not stipulate to the
admission of the evidence, defendant sought to use the polygraph to
corroborate his trial testimony. The court then examined in some detail
various techniques used by polygraph examiners.79 It noted that the
technique used by defendant's examiner, the hybrid control question
technique, had only been the subject of one scientific study, a study co-

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 920.
Id.
133 F.3d 809 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 811.
885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1536.
133 F.3d at 812-14.

1028

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

authored by the examiner.8 0 The Government, on the other hand,
presented substantial evidence tending to show the technique was not
reliable and, specifically, that it increased the number of false negatives,
that is, guilty people appearing to be innocent."1 "Considering the
paucity of tests and published studies addressing the validity of the
hybrid technique, and Gilliard's failure to show that the hybrid
technique has gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community," the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the polygraph evidence. 2
In Agro Air Associates, Inc. v. Houston Casualty Co.," the Eleventh
Circuit reaffirmed that lay witnesses may state their opinions if those
opinions are rationally based on the witness's perception, and they are
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony. In Agro the
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it permitted lay witnesses to testify why they thought an insured's
premium rates increased after an insurer cancelled, fraudulently
according to the insured, the insured's policy.'
The Eleventh Circuit faced a more difficult issue of lay opinion
testimony in United States v. Pierce.5 In Pierce defendant contended
the district court improperly allowed his employer and his probation
officer to testify, after reviewing bank surveillance photographs, that the
photographs likely depicted defendant. Defendant argued that this "lay
opinion identification testimony" was not admissible because it was not
helpful to the jury, that is, the jury was just as qualified to review the
photographs and determine whether defendant was the perpetrator
shown in the photographs. Moreover, defendant argued, one of the
witnesses acknowledged she was not one-hundred percent certain that
the individual in the photograph was defendant."
The Eleventh
Circuit noted that this was an issue of first impression for the Eleventh
Circuit. 7 However, the court agreed with a majority of the circuits
that, given the right circumstances, lay opinion identification testimony

80. Id. at 814.
81. Id. at 814-15.
82. In United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998), the Supreme Court held that
a flat prohibition on the admission of polygraph evidence by Military Rule of Evidence 707
did not impinge a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense to charges
against him. Id. at 1263. The Court noted "there is simply no consensus that polygraph

evidence is reliable: the scientific community and the state and federal courts are
extremely polarized on the matter." Id. at 1262.
83. 128 F.3d 1452 (11th Cir. 1997).
84. Id. at 1456.
85. 136 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 1998).
86. Id. at 773.
87. Id. at 772.

1999]

EVIDENCE

1029

may be helpful to the jury and thus, admissible.8 For example, the
witness may be much more familiar with the defendant's appearance
and thus, in a better position to testify whether defendant is shown in
a photograph. After closely examining the facts of the case, the court
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
allowed the witnesses to express their opinion that defendant was
depicted in the photograph. s9
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros
Chemicals, Inc.90 is perhaps more notable for its harsh criticism of the
manner in which the district court resolved evidentiary issues than it is
for the actual treatment of those issues. ("The district court's opinion is
far from clear ... "91 "[Tihe conclusory and disjointed miscellany that
constitutes the district court's discussion .....
"It is apparent that
this problem, along with many others that we identify in this part of the
opinion, might have been avoided had the district court simply held a
Daubert hearing .. .. "[W]e endeavor to clarify the legal errors that
permeate the district court's discussion....").94 In Harcrosthirty-nine
Alabama municipalities alleged that chlorine distributors engaged in a
conspiracy to fix prices for repackaged chlorine. In a lengthy opinion,
the district court ruled much of plaintiff's evidence inadmissible and
granted summary judgment to all five defendants on plaintiffs' antitrust
and fraud claims. 95 Among other things, the district court excluded the
testimony of an accountant on the grounds that he was not qualified to
testify on opinions based on economic theory.96 The Eleventh Circuit
sarcastically agreed that the accountant was not qualified to render
opinions on economic theory but noted that "[n]owhere in his extensive
testimony, however, did [the accountant] offer any such opinion."
Rather, the accountant offered testimony well within the scope of his
qualifications.9 8
The court then turned to the district court's exclusion of evidence
offered by a statistician." While the court noted the small portions of

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 776.
Id.
158 F.3d 548 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 564 n.19.
Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 564 n.21.
Id. at 565 n.23.
Id. at 553.
See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
158 F.3d at 563.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 564.
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the statistician's testimony were properly excluded, there was no basis
for excluding the testimony in its entirety and, in fact, the district court
erroneously interpreted Rule 702 when it excluded the testimony.'"
The district court disapproved of the statistician's methodology because
it was based on his subjective judgment, judgment that could not be
tested. The statistics themselves, the district court concluded, showed
anything but a successful conspiracy. 1 ' This analysis confounded the
Eleventh Circuit.
We first consider an error that pervades the court's opinion: the
confusion and conflation of admissibility issues with issues regarding
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence to survive summary judgment.
To put it succinctly, [the statistician's] data and testimony need not
'show a successful conspiracy' to be admitted under Rule 702 as
circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy. As expert evidence, the
testimony need only assist the trier of fact, through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. As circumstantial evidence,
[the statistician's] data and testimony need not prove the plaintiffs'
the puzzle
case by themselves; they must merely constitute one piece0of
2
that the plaintiffs' endeavor to assemble before the jury.
Thus, the district court, by requiring the statistician's testimony to show
a successful conspiracy, misinterpreted Rule 702 and abused its
discretion.0 3
To make matters worse, according to the Eleventh Circuit, the district
court also misinterpreted Rule 104(b), which allows a district court to
determine preliminary questions of fact necessary to apply the Federal
Rules of Evidence.0 4 This rule, the Eleventh Circuit noted, does not
provide a ground for the exclusion of evidence!0 5 The district court
apparently concluded that the statistician's testimony was not reliable
and thus, was not admissible under Rule 104. This, the court held, was
improper; the reliability of the testimony should have been addressed
under Rule 702 and Daubert.'° Thus, the court concluded, the district
court again abused its discretion
when it used Rule 104 to exclude the
07
statistician's testimony.

100. Id. at 564-65.
101. Id. at 564.

102. Id. at 564-65.
103. Id. at 565.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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It would seem that the lesson to be learned from Harcros (other than
the message that district courts subject themselves to scathing condemnation for loose analysis) is that the resolution of Daubert issues
requires careful thought and analysis and will likely require a hearing.
VI.

HEARSAY

It was an off year for the Eleventh Circuit with regard to hearsay

issues; only three decisions merit comment. In two cases, the court
illustrated the circumstances that bring a statement by an agent or an
employee within the scope of Rule 801(d)(2)(D), which provides that "a
statement by the [party's] agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of his agency or employment [and] made during the existence
of the relationship" is not hearsay l 8 In City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros
Chemicals, Inc.," ° the facts of which are discussed above, the district
court ruled inadmissible testimony about alleged admissions by Robert
Jones, the former chairman, chief executive officer, and president of one
of defendant companies. This executive allegedly admitted to friends
that he and his company were involved in fixing chlorine prices. The
district court, applying Alabama law, excluded the testimony on the
grounds it was hearsay and was not admissible because "'the president
of a corporation is not the "alter ego" of the corporation,' and that [he]
therefore did not 'speak for' the corporation.""' Applying Alabama law
was clearly erroneous because, generally speaking, the Federal Rules of
Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence in federal court."'
Concluding the testimony was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), the
Eleventh Circuit reversed." 2 First, as an executive, Jones was clearly
an "agent or servant" of the company."' Second, Jones set chlorine
prices for his company throughout the period of the alleged conspiracy." 4 Thus, his statements about chlorine pricing practices "'concern[ed] a matter within the scope of [his] agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship.'"" 5

108. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2)(1).
109. 158 F.3d 548.
110. Id. at 558 n.10.
111. Id. See also Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1607, 1608 (1997).
112. 158 F.3d at 574.
113. Id. at 557.
114. Id. at 558.
115. Id. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that Jones's statements
were not admissible as a co-conspirator's statement pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because
his statements, which were made to friends on social occasions, were not in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Id.
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On the other hand, in Zaben v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.,116
the Eleventh Circuit found that statements by employees were not made
within the scope of their authority as employees. In Zaben plaintiff
claimed his former employer had discriminated against him in violation
of the Age Discrimination In Employment Act.'17 In response to
defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff relied on evidence
of statements made by two low-level supervisors at defendant's plant.
Plaintiff claimed these supervisors told him that " 'they [meaning higher
officials at the company] was [sic] talking about getting rid of the older
employees,' and that 'they wanted younger employees to train them the
way they wanted them.'"" 8 The district court ruled that these statements were hearsay and thus, not admissible." 9 On appeal the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that statements made by supervisory
employees are admissible if their statements are within the scope of
authority invested in them by their employer. 2 ° However, neither of
the supervisors, whose alleged statements plaintiff relied upon,
possessed any authority to speak for the employer on personnel
matters.' 2 ' Thus, their statements were not within the scope of their
authority 12 at the company.'2 2 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that statements by a party's co-conspirator
are admissible if made during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 24 In United States v. West, 25 defendant contended that
the district court improperly relied on Rule 801(d)(2)(E) when it
admitted a notebook in his trial for drug-related charges. Agents
discovered the notebook during a raid on a house belonging to one of
defendant's alleged co-conspirators. Another co-conspirator told agents
the "items in the house" belonged to him or to yet another co-conspirator.12

At trial an FBI agent testified that the notebook was a ledger

containing records of a drug distribution operation. 27 On appeal the
Eleventh Circuit noted that before admitting an alleged co-conspirator's

116. 129 F.3d 1453 (11th Cir. 1997).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1998).
118. 129 F.3d at 1455.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1456.
121. Id. at 1457.

122. Id.
123. Id. at 1459.

124.
125.
126.
127.

FED. R. EvDm. 801(a)(2)(E).
142 F.3d 1408 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1411.
Id.
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statement, the district court must determine: (1) a conspiracy existed;
(2) the declarant and defendant were part of the conspiracy; and (3) the
declarant made the statement during the course of and in furtherance
of the conspiracy. 128 The Government argued that circumstantial
evidence established a co-conspirator authored the notebook."2 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that the district court "clearly erred
when it failed to make the preliminary factual determinations that rule
801(d)(2)(E) and the case law from this circuit require." 3 ° The
apparent fatal defect was that the district court never identified the
author and thus, could not have concluded the author was a member of
the conspiracy, and that the entries in the notebook were in furtherance
of the conspiracy.' 1 Although the court concluded this error was
harmless, the court's focus on the district court's failure to identify the
author of the notebook concerned Senior Judge Roney who concurred
specially.132 He argued that the fact that the author of the notebook
was unknown did not preclude its admissibility."3
Indeed, Judge
Roney argued, all but one circuit addressing the issue, including the
Eleventh Circuit, has held that anonymous documents may be admitted
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).1 4 Judge Roney specially noted that the
majority's discussion on this point was dictum because its discussion
was
135
not necessary given its holding that any error was harmless.
VII.

CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS
136
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Francis
illustrates the broad scope of Rule 1006, which allows the admission of
summaries of "voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which
cannot conveniently be examined in court ....
In Francis federal
agents, acting on a tip that defendants were attempting to contract for
the assassination of an informant and a prosecutor, recorded defendants'
telephone conversations. On appeal from their convictions for conspiring
to murder a federal official and using interstate and foreign commerce
facilities in commission of murder for hire, defendants argued that the
"'13

128. Id. at 1413-14.
129. Id. at 1414.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1415.
Id.
Id. at 1415-16.
Id. at 1415.
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district court erroneously admitted summaries of the wiretapped
telephone conversations. The conversations were conducted in Jamaican
patois, which is mostly English but also contains West African,
Portuguese, French, and Spanish words, with the words arranged in a
different order than in standard English. An FBI agent first prepared
translated transcripts of the tape recorded conversations. The same
agent then prepared summaries of the conversations. At trial the tapes
of the conversations, the translated transcripts of the conversations, and
the summaries of the conversations were all admitted into evidence. 138
The Eleventh Circuit rejected defendants' argument that the summaries
were inadmissible. 3 ' "To prevent the necessity of playing all seventysix conversations in their entirety, the court exercised its discretion and
admitted the summaries into evidence.""4° The court also rejected
41
defendants' arguments that the summaries were argumentative.
Although the court recognized the potential prejudice of summaries
prepared by the prosecution, the court was satisfied there had been no
"undue editorializing. " 142 Further, the court noted that the district
court instructed the jury that the summaries had been prepared by the
government and that the actual recordings, which were in evidence, were
the primary and governing evidence of the contents of the conversations. 43 The district court also made clear to the jury that the summaries were not the court's summaries of the conversations, and if the
jury concluded the summaries did not accurately reflect the contents of
the conversations, the jury should disregard them.'" These instructions, the Eleventh Circuit held, were adequate to minimize undue
prejudice." 5
Finally, defendants extensively cross-examined the
government agent who prepared the summaries, and thus, the court
46
concluded, "neutralized" any possible prejudice.

138. 131 F.3d at 1454-55.
139. Id. at 1459.
140. Id. at 1458.
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